Hitler's rise to power

I wrote my paper on different perspectives on Hitler's rise to power. I used four sources from Kershaw, Fritzsche, Bessel and another historian Karl Bracher. I found it really interesting that the arguments argued that he emerged out of the chaos from the Weimar Republic (as the 1st two authors did) or as a result of gaining popular support (as is the case with the latter 2). There were then two interpretations which either saw Hitler as an opportunist (Fritsche, Bessel) or intentionally manipulated the populations or government (Kershaw, Bracher) to gain support. As my paper came together, I quickly (or not so quickly) found that Hitler had both intentionally manipulated the people and systems because conditions offered him the opportunity to do so. For example, Kershaw argues that the Hitler myth created a perception of Hitler essentially as the image of all that is good. But the people gave him the opportunity to emerge as the man that they wanted to pull them out of their troubles forged through the Weimar Republic. Had the people not needed the man, the myth would have been pointless.

Another example is that Bessel argues that Hitler emerged because the discontent of the people presented the opportunity to unite them in a non-traditional political system. But Hitler intentionally manipulated the Weimar system and united the people under a new nationalism. In short, the differing perspectives I found played together really nicely and made it apparent that no story can be told from a narrow point of view.

German soldier's dilemma

During the Soviet occupation of Berlin and Germany, many German soldiers came home from a lost conflict often to find their wives fraternizing or even sleeping with the enemy soldiers. This was an incredible blow to the German soldiers because not only had they failed in their war effort and been destroyed by the Allied forces, but now the one area where they could maintain a strong influence, at home, is being torn apart by the same men who had destroyed their army and killed fellow soldiers. There is a strong argument in defense of the Soviet soldiers soldiers actions. They had just been victorious in their campaign, but had spent the last years fighting a gruesome battle on their own land and had witnessed the atrocities that the Germans had committed against the civilian population and many of the soldiers had been directly affected by this. Once they had gained the upper hand, it was they felt it was their chance to wreak havoc in the German home front.

The Germans, however, were lost in their ability to accept responsibility for their loss in the war and when they return to find their women fraternizing with the enemy, they immediately point the finger at the women who were too weak to resist the soldiers even though it was the much more so the soldiers fault for not being able to protect their country and ultimately their family from the barbarian Soviets who invaded and destroyed not only their country, but their home and family.

German soldier's dilemma

The Hitler Myth

I think the Hitler myth had a huge influence on the German population throughout the 1930s and 40s, namely the 'non-organized masses' and the Nazi party itself. I think the populations was interested in finding a leader who exhibited the qualities that society as a whole valued, such as being a military leader, working against Marxism, and improving the economic situation. Hitler proved to be a great 'puppet' for these purposes because even though he did not exhibit the seven qualities listed for the myth, the popular perception was that he was all of those things. The people were looking for a modern party that would address their interests as a whole which is exactly the appeal of Nazism. Because they turned away from the traditional parties, a void was left that the Nazi party quickly filled. The non-organized masses of people who had no strong connections to parties or social groups were greatly influenced by these myths because it created a place where they could belong and connected them into something they believed in. furthermore, the bandwagon effect took hold of these people getting them to join the cause largely because the people around them were. The party itself was also greatly affected by the myth because it almost deified Hitler and made the whole party submit personally to him. This creates a personal attachment of the individual to Hitler (not the state) because they viewed him as irreplaceable.

Interest groups and the rise of the people

In 1918, terms emerged with the focus on the people "such as Volksgemeinshaft (people's community), Volksstaat (people's state), and Volkspartei (people's party)" which "acknowledged that unity" was necessary to challenged the Socialist left. The revolution involved all parts of society and "nowhere in the Reich did the revolution encounter opposition," as it included support from "men and women, workers and burqhers, city and countryside, (and) socialists and nationalists." This mass support for the revolution took the power away from the established government and its leaders.

With this mass support and the mentality that people had that they could be successful in not only the large-scale revolution, but also in more focused agendas, the middle class began gravitating towards interest groups and unions. People spoke "most loudly as constituents of particular social and economic interests" with a focus on occupational concerns. Numerous interest groups were established, such as the socialist Free Trade Union which tripled in size compared to pre-war participation.

This huge increase in political activity by the middle-class upset the norms of previous society and government. Which such active participants who were focused on certain specific issues, the right wing lost huge amounts of support and representation in the Reichstag. This revolution gave a much more recognized voice to the middle-class through their ability to join together in small interest groups with direct focuses to upset the social norms of pre-war Germany.

Often, we find that history is written about the winners and the more powerful citizens. Because of this, the day to day lives and feelings of the lower class or peasants are often very poorly documented and recorded. This leads to the generalizations that we have about the lower class sort of being a group of static farmers, or lower class artisans who did not have much influence and presumably do not have opinions, political views, or special interests. Blackbourn's article goes against this concept of a cookie-cutter image for the peasants and expands on it declaring that they were living very dynamic lives which influenced them enough to gain and act on their political views.

At this time, the peasantry were facing economic pressures due to economic depression in the 1870s, falling grain prices, and tariffs. This led them to have a resentment and misunderstanding of the market because they were not able to peak their heads above the walls of their small community to see the national economic problems that trickled down and affected them. They see the three enemies of the school, military, and railroads as the enemy coupled with the distrust they had for the city.

In protest of tough times around them, the peasants began to vote protestingly against the main political parties not because they supported the smaller interest groups, but largely because they blamed the major political parties for the issues that affected their daily lives. By losing this mass of support, the main political parties were forced to adopt platforms that the masses would support so that they could remain in office.

In short, the powerful political parties were unfocused on the peasantry interests and its policies eventually angered the peasantry. In response, the peasantry voted against these political parties in hope that their protests would force the parties to adopt more favorable platforms. This is a perfect example of changing politics from the ground up.

During the 1960s to 1970s theories began to emerge about the German Songerweg period of 1871 to 1945 in regards to the creation of the Third Reich of Nazi Germany. Two historians, Wehler and Kocka, emerged first with their interpretation attributed to the Belielefeld school. At the heart of their interpretation is that this period was marked by an absence of political modernization, particularly democratization and parliamentarization in the liberal sense, in conjunction with rapid economic modernization with a capitalist market economy. Power over the army and civil and diplomatic services was concentrated in the hands of the monarchs and aristocracy and it was presumably the German bourgiosie's responsibility to overturn these norms, but instead accepted a "free hand in the economy" and "abandon(ed) its political liberalism. This also contributed to the relative weakness of the liberals among other reasons such as their lack of a sufficient regional support, 'narrow' political views, the split of liberals because of Bismarck's tariff policy in 1873. Bismarck's Bonapartist tactics suppressed the liberals by essentially preoccupying the country with 'social imperialism' of defusing domestic tensions with foreign concerns and 'negative integration' of uniting Germans together by creating a presumed enemy, specifically against Catholics, socialists, and Poles. Wehler and Kocka see him as an evil Bonapartist who caused liberal failure and whose policies prevented the overturn of their unintegrated government.

Eley and Blackbourn criticize this theory because it assumes that the "aristocracy is inherently feudal" and that the "bourgeoisie by nature liberal" and that the bourgeoisie missed their chance for revolution and therefore the fate of Germany was more closely associated with "the non-occurrence of a bourgeois revolution and the absence of a parliamentary democracy." They also criticize that there is an "insufficient distinction" between the parliamentary system in politics and capitalist modes of production. They also argue that Bismarck successfully manipulated the masses and therefore actually enacted political mobilization earlier than other European countries. Though Eley and Blackbourn are not greatly accepted, the fact that they challenged the Bielefeld schools interpretations and saw Bismarck's actions as successful and viewed the latter events on the lack of elements opened the door for more historians to analyze and critique others or create their own interpretations.